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A fully-distributed proximal-point algorithm for Nash equilibrium
seeking with linear convergence rate
Mattia Bianchi, Giuseppe Belgioioso, and Sergio Grammatico
Abstract—We address the Nash equilibrium problem in a
partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can
only observe the actions of some neighbors, while its cost
possibly depends on the strategies of other agents. Our main
contribution is the design of a fully-distributed, single-layer,
fixed-step algorithm, based on a proximal best-response aug-
mented with consensus terms. To derive our algorithm, we
follow an operator-theoretic approach. First, we recast the Nash
equilibrium problem as that of finding a zero of a monotone
operator. Then, we demonstrate that the resulting inclusion
can be solved in a fully-distributed way via a proximal-
point method, thanks to the use of a novel preconditioning
matrix. We prove linear convergence of our algorithm to a
Nash equilibrium, under strong monotonicity and Lipschitz
continuity of the game mapping. Furthermore, we show that our
method outperforms the fastest known gradient-based schemes,
both in terms of guaranteed convergence rate, via theoretical
analysis, and in practice, via numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nash equilibrium (NE) problems have received increasing
attention with the spreading of networked systems, due to
the numerous engineering applications, including communi-
cation networks [1], demand-side management in the smart
grid [2], charging/discharging of electric vehicles [3] and
demand response in competitive markets [4]. These scenarios
are characterized by the presence of multiple selfish decision-
makers, or agents, that aim at optimizing their individual, yet
inter-dependent, objective functions. From a game-theoretic
perspective, one of the challenges is to assign to the agents
behavioral rules that eventually ensure the attainment of
a NE, a joint action from which no agent has interest to
unilaterally deviate.
Literature review Typically, NE seeking algorithms are
designed under the assumption that each agent can access the
decisions of all the competitors, for example in the presence
of a coordinator that broadcasts the data to the network
[5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. However the existence of a central
node with bidirectional communication with all the agents is
impractical for many applications [10], [11]. One example
is the Nash-Cournot competition model described in [12],
where the profit of each of a group of firms depends not only
on its own production, but also on the whole amount of sales,
a quantity not directly accessible by any of the firms. This
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motivates the development of fully-distributed algorithms,
which allow to compute NEs relying on local data only.
Two main approaches have been proposed, corresponding
to two different information structures. For games where
each agent can measure its own cost functions, pay-off based
schemes were developed that do not require peer-to-peer
communication [13], [14]. Instead, we consider the so-called
partial-decision information scenario, where the agents hold
an analytic expression of their own cost functions, but they
are unable to evaluate the actual values, since they cannot
access the strategies of all the competitors. To remedy
the lack of knowledge, the agents engage in nonstrategic
information exchange with some neighbors on a network;
from the data received, they can estimate the strategies of
all other agents, and eventually reconstruct the true values.
This setup has only been introduced very recently. Most
of the results available resort to (projected) gradient and
consensus dynamics, both in continuous time [15]–[17], and
discrete time. For the discrete time case, early works [12],
[18], focused on algorithms with vanishing step sizes, which
typically result in slow convergence. More recently, fixed-
step schemes were introduced in [19]–[21], building on a
restricted monotonicity property, first revealed in [17]. The
drawback is that, due to the partial-decision information
assumption, small step sizes have to be chosen, affecting the
speed of convergence. Of particular interest for this paper is
the technique developed by Pavel in [21], that characterized
the equilibria of a (generalized) game as the zeros of a
monotone operator. The operator-theoretic approach is very
elegant and convenient, since several splittings methods are
already well established to solve monotone inclusions [22,
26]. For example, the authors of [23] adopted a precondi-
tioned proximal-point algorithm (PPPA); yet, this results in a
double-layer scheme, where the agents have to communicate
multiple times to solve (inexactly) a subgame, at each step.
Similarly, the proximal best-response dynamics proposed in
[24] for stochastic games require an increasing number of
data transmissions per iteration.
Contribution: Motivated by the above, in this paper we
further exploit the restricted monotonicity property used in
[19]–[21] to solve Nash equilibrium problems under partial-
decision information. Specifically:
• We derive a simple, fully-distributed proximal-point algo-
rithm (PPA), that is a proximal best-response augmented
with consensual terms. Thanks to the use of a novel
preconditioning matrix, our algorithm is single-layer, i.e.,
it requires only one communication per iteration. To the
best of our knowledge, our PPPA is the first non-gradient
based algorithm with this feature (III-IV);
• We prove global linear convergence of our algorithm to a
NE, under strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of
the game mapping, by providing a general result for the
PPA of restricted strongly monotone operators (IV);
• We demonstrate, both by comparing the theoretical con-
vergence rates and in simulation, that our algorithm out-
performs existing gradient-based dynamics, in terms of the
number of iterations needed to convergence. (V-VI).
Basic notation: N is the set of natural numbers, including
0. R denotes the set of real numbers. 0n (1n) denotes the
vector of dimension n with all elements equal to 0 (1);
In ∈ Rn×n denotes the identity matrix of dimension n; the
subscripts might be omitted when there is no ambiguity. For
a matrix A ∈ Rn×m, its transpose is A⊤, [A]i,j represents
the element on the row i and column j. null(A) = {x ∈
R
m | Ax = 0n} and range(A) = {v ∈ Rn | v =
Ax for some x ∈ Rm} are the null-space and image of
A, respectively. A⊗B denotes the Kronecker product of the
matrices A and B. ‖A‖ denotes the largest singular value
of A. A ≻ 0 stands for symmetric positive definite matrix.
Given A ≻ 0, 〈x | y〉A = x⊤Ay denotes the A-induced
inner product of the vectors x and y, ‖x‖A =
√
x⊤Ax
denotes the the A-induced norm of the vector x; we omit
the subscript if A = I . If A ∈ Rn×n is symmetric,
λmin(A) := λ1(A) ≤ · · · ≤ λn(A) =: λmax(A) denote its
eigenvalues. diag(A1, . . . , AN ) denotes the block diagonal
matrix with A1, . . . , AN on its diagonal. Given N vectors
x1, . . . , xN , x := col (x1, . . . , xN ) = [x
⊤
1 . . . x
⊤
N ]
⊤, and for
each i = 1, . . . , N , x−i := col (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ).
For a differentiable function g : Rn → R, ∇xg(x) denotes
its gradient.
Operator-theoretic background: For a function ψ : Rn →
R ∪ {∞}, dom(ψ) = {x ∈ Rn | ψ(x) <∞}. The mapping
ιS : R
n → {0, ∞} denotes the indicator function for the
set S ⊆ Rn, i.e., ιS(x) = 0 if x ∈ S, ∞ otherwise. A set-
valued mapping (or operator) F : Rn ⇒ Rn is characterized
by its graph gra(F) = {(x, u) | u ∈ F(x)}. dom(F) =
{x ∈ Rn|F(x) 6= ∅}, fix (F) = {x ∈ Rn | x ∈ F(x)}
and zer (F) = {x ∈ Rn | 0 ∈ F(x)} denote the domain, set
of fixed points and set of zeros, respectively. F−1 denotes
the inverse mapping of F , defined through its graph as
gra(F−1) = {(u, x) | (x, u) ∈ gra(F)}. F : Rn ⇒ Rn is
(µ-strongly) monotone if 〈u− v, x− y〉 ≥ 0 (≥ µ‖x− y‖2),
for all (x, u),(y, v) ∈ gra(F). Id(·) denotes the identity
operator. For a function ψ : Rn → R ∪ {∞}, ∂ψ :
dom(ψ) ⇒ Rn denotes its subdifferential operator, defined
as ∂ψ(x) = {v ∈ Rn | ψ(z) ≥ ψ(x)+v⊤(z−x) for all z ∈
dom(ψ)}. NS : Rn ⇒ Rn is the normal cone operator
for the the set S ⊆ Rn, i.e., NS(x) = ∅ if x /∈ S,{
v ∈ Rn | supz∈S v⊤(z − x) ≤ 0
}
otherwise. If S is closed
and convex, it holds that ∂ιS = NS , and (Id+NS)
−1 = PS
is the Euclidean projection onto the set S. JF := (Id+F)−1
denotes the resolvent operator of F .
II. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND
We consider a set of agents, I := {1, . . . , N}, where
each agent i ∈ I shall choose its decision variable (i.e.,
strategy) xi from its local decision set Ωi ⊆ Rni . Let
x = col((xi)i∈I) ∈ Ω denote the stacked vector of all the
agents’ decisions, Ω = Ω1× . . .ΩN ⊆ Rn the overall action
space and n :=
∑N
i=1 ni. The goal of each agent i ∈ I is to
minimize its objective function Ji(xi, x−i), which depends
both on the local variable xi and on the decision variables
of the other agents x−i := col((xj)j∈I\{i}). Then, the game
is represented by the following inter-dependent optimization
problems:
∀i ∈ I : argmin
yi∈Ωi
Ji(yi, x−i). (1)
Our goal here is to compute a NE, as defined next.
Definition 1: A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies
x∗ = col ((x∗i )i∈I) ∈ Ω such that
∀i ∈ I : x∗i ∈ argmin
yi∈Ωi
Ji
(
yi, x
∗
−i
)
.
The following assumptions are standard for NE problems,
see, e.g., [20, Ass. 1], [17, Ass. 2].
Standing Assumption 1 (Regularity and convexity): For
each i ∈ I, the set Ωi is non-empty, closed and convex; Ji
is continuous and the function Ji (·, x−i) is continuously
differentiable and convex for every x−i. 
Under Standing Assumption 1, a collective strategy x∗ is
a NE of the game in (1) if and only if it is a solution of the
variational inequality VI(F,Ω)1 [25, Prop. 1.4.2], where F
is the pseudo-gradient mapping of the game:
F (x) := col ((∇xiJi(xi, x−i))i∈I) . (2)
Equivalently, x∗ is a NE if and only if the following holds:
0n∈ F (x∗) + NΩ (x∗). (3)
A sufficient condition for the existence of a unique NE for the
game in (1) is the strong monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient
[25, Th. 2.3.3], as postulated next. This assumption is always
used for (G)NE seeking under partial-decision information
with fixed step sizes, e.g., [21, Ass. 2], [15, Ass. 4], [20,
Ass. 2].
Standing Assumption 2: The pseudo-gradient mapping F
in (2) is µ-strongly monotone and θ0-Lipschitz continuous,
for some µ, θ0 > 0: for any x, y ∈ Rn, (x − y)⊤(F (x) −
F (y)) ≥ µ‖x− y‖2 and ‖F (x)− F (y)‖ ≤ θ0‖x− y‖. 
III. DISTRIBUTED NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING
In this section, we present an algorithm to seek a NE of
the game (1) in a fully-distributed way. Specifically, each
agent i only knows its own cost function Ji and feasible set
Ωi. Moreover, agent i does not have full knowledge of x−i,
and only relies on the information exchanged locally with
1Given a set S ⊆ Rm and a mapping ψ : S → Rm, the variational
inequality VI(ψ, S) is the problem of finding a vector ω∗ ∈ S such that
ψ(ω∗)⊤(ω − ω∗) ≥ 0, for all ω ∈ S.
Algorithm 1 Fully-distributed Nash equilibrium seeking via preconditioned proximal-point iteration
Initialization: For all i ∈ I, set x0i ∈ Ωi, x0i,−i ∈ Rn−ni .
For all k > 0: Communication: The agents exchange the variables {xki ,xki,−i} with their neighbors.
Local variables update: each agent i ∈ I does:
xk+1i,−i =
1
2 (x
k
i,−i +
∑N
j=1 wi,jx
k
j,−i)
xk+1i = argmin
y∈Ωi
(
Ji(y,x
k+1
i,−i) +
1
2α
∥∥y − xki ∥∥2 + 12α∥∥y −∑Nj=1 wi,jxkj,i∥∥2)
some neighbors over a communication network G(I, E). The
unordered pair (i, j) belongs to the set of edges, E , if and
only if agent i and j can mutually exchange information.
We denote: W = [wi,j ]i,j∈I ∈ RN×N the weighted mixing
matrix of G, with wi,j > 0 if (i, j) ∈ E , wi,j = 0 otherwise;
Ni = {j | (i, j) ∈ E} the set of neighbors of agent i.
Standing Assumption 3: The communication graph
G(I, E) is undirected and connected. 
For ease of notation, we will also assume that every
node of the graph has a self-loop and that W is doubly
stochastic; this condition is not strictly necessary and can
be dropped (see IV, Remark 4). Nonetheless, we note that
such a mixing matrix can be distributedly generated on any
connected undirected graph, e.g., by assigning Metropolis
weights [26, Section 2.4].
Standing Assumption 4: The mixing matrix W satisfies
the following conditions:
(i) Self loops: wi,i > 0 for all i ∈ I;
(ii) Symmetry: W =W⊤;
(iii) Double stochasticity: W1N = 1N . 
In the partial-decision information scenario, to cope with
the lack of knowledge each agent keeps an estimate of
all other agents’ action [20], [18], [15]. We denote xi =
col((xi,j)j∈I) ∈ RNn, where xi,i := xi and xi,j is
i’s estimate of agent j’s action, for all j 6= i; let also
xj,−i := col((xj,ℓ)ℓ∈I\{i}). Our proposed fully-distributed
NE seeking dynamics are summarized in Algorithm 1, where
α > 0 is a global constant parameter.
In steady state, agents should agree on their estimates, i.e.,
xi = xj for all i, j ∈ I. In fact, the updates of the estimates
xki,−i resembles a consensus protocol, and can be interpreted
as the attempt of the agents to reach an agreement on the time
varying quantity x. In turn, the strategy xi of each agent is
updated based on a proximal best-response, augmented with
an extra disagreement penalization term. We remark that the
agents evaluate their cost functions in their local estimates,
not on the actual collective strategy.
Remark 1: The functions Ji(·,xi,−i) are strongly convex,
for all xi,−i, for all i ∈ I, as a consequence of Standing
Assumption 2. Therefore the argmin operator in Algorithm 1
is single-valued and the algorithm is always well-defined. 
We note that in Algorithm 1, each agent keeps and
exchanges an estimate of the strategies of all other agents.
Thus, the computation and communication costs increase
with the number of agents. This is the main drawback of
the partial-decision information scenario. An open research
direction is to design dynamics that allow each agent to
estimate the strategies of only some of its competitors,
when the inference graph is sparse (i.e., when the cost of
each agent only depends on the action of a limited subset
of other agents). Instead, efficient solutions are known for
aggregative games, where the agents are only required to
keep an estimate of the aggregation value [27], [12].
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first derive Algorithm 1 as a PPPA.
Then, we prove its convergence by leveraging a restricted
monotonicity property, under which classical results for the
PPA of monotone operators still hold.
Before going into details, we need some definitions. We
denote x = col((xi)i∈I). Besides, let, for all i ∈ I [21,
Eq.13-14],
Ri :=
[
0ni×n<i Ini 0ni×n>i
]
, (4a)
Si :=
[
In<i 0n<i×ni 0n<i×n>i
0n>i×n<i 0n>i×ni In>i
]
, (4b)
where n<i :=
∑
j<i,j∈I nj , n>i :=
∑
j>i,j∈I nj . In
simple terms, Ri selects the i-th ni dimensional component
from an n-dimensional vector, while Si removes it. Thus,
Rixi = xi,i = xi and Sixi = xi,−i. We define R :=
diag ((Ri)i∈I), S := diag ((Si)i∈I). It follows that x = Rx
and col((xi,−i)i∈I) = Sx ∈ R(N−1)n. Moreover, we have
that
x = R⊤x+ S⊤Sx. (5)
We define the extended pseudo-gradient operator F as
F (x) := col ((∇xiJi (xi,xi,−i))i∈I) , (6)
and the mappings
F a(x) := αR⊤F (x) + (INn −W )x, (7)
A(x) := F ax+NΩ(x), (8)
where α > 0 is a fixed parameter, and
W :=W ⊗ In, (9)
Ω := {x ∈ RnN | Rx ∈ Ω}. (10)
The following lemma relates the NE of the game in (1)
to the operators F a and A. The proof is analogous to [20,
Prop. 1], and hence it is omitted.
Lemma 1: The following statements are equivalent:
i) x∗ = 1N ⊗x∗, with x∗ ∈ Ω the NE of the game in (1);
ii) x∗ solves VI(F a,Ω);
iii) 0Nn ∈ A(x∗). 
A. Derivation of the algorithm
Lemma 1 is fundamental because it provides a systematic
way of deriving fully-distributed NE seeking algorithms,
by applying standard solution methods for VI(F a,Ω) (e.g.,
in [20], a projected gradient-method was developed) or
operator splitting methods to compute a zero of the operator
A(x) (e.g., [21] follows a similar approach for games
with coupling constraints). Nonetheless, technical difficulties
arise because of the partial-decision information assumption.
Specifically, the operator R⊤F is not monotone for most
cases of interest, not even if strong monotonicity of the
pseudo-gradient mapping F holds, i.e., Standing Assumption
2. Only when the estimates x belong to the consensus
subspace, i.e. x = 1N ⊗ x, we have that F (x) = F (x).
In fact, Algorithm 1 is an instance of (suitably precondi-
tioned) PPA [22, Th. 23.41] to seek a zero of A. We remark
that many operator-theoretic properties are not guaranteed for
the resolvent of a non-monotone operator B : Rm ⇒ Rm.
For example, JB = (Id + B)−1 may have a limited domain,
or be not single-valued. In this general case we write the
PPA as
ωk+1 ∈ JB(ωk), (11)
that is well defined only if JB(ωk) 6= ∅. Next, we show that
Algorithm 1 is obtained by applying the iteration in (11) to
the operator Φ−1A, where
Φ := INn +W , (12)
is a symmetric, positive definite matrix, known as precondi-
tioning matrix. We note that Φ ≻ 0 under Standing Assump-
tion 4, by Gershgorin circle theorem, and that zer(A) =
zer(Φ−1A).
Lemma 2: Algorithm 1 is equivalent to
xk+1 ∈ JΦ−1A(xk),
with A as in (8), Φ as in (12). 
Proof: By definition of inverse operator we have that
xk+1 ∈ (Id + Φ−1A)−1xk
⇔ 0Nn ∈ xk+1 +Φ−1Axk+1 − xk
⇔ 0Nn ∈ Φ(xk+1 − xk) +Axk+1
⇔ 0Nn ∈ xk+1 +✘✘✘✘Wxk+1 − xk −Wxk + xk+1
−✘✘✘✘Wxk+1 + αR⊤F (xk+1) + NΩ(xk+1).
(13)
In turn, the last inclusion can be split in two components
by left-multiplying both sides with R and S. Therefore, by
SNΩ = 0(N−1)n and SR⊤ = 0(N−1)n×n, (13) is equivalent
to 

0(N−1)n ∈ S(2xk+1 − xk)− SWxk
0n ∈ xk+1 − xk + xk+1 −RWxk +NΩ(xk+1)
+ αF (xk+1,Sxk+1)
⇔
∀i∈I


xk+1i,−i =
1
2 (x
k
i,−i +
∑N
j=1 wi,jx
k
j,−i)
0ni ∈ ∂xk+1
i
(
Ji(x
k+1
i ,x
k+1
i,−i) +
1
2α
∥∥xk+1i − xki ∥∥2
+ 12α
∥∥xk+1i −∑Nj=1 wi,jxkj,i∥∥2
+ ιΩi (x
k+1
i )
)
.
The conclusion follows since the zeros of the subdifferential
of a (strongly) convex function coincide with the minima
(unique minimum) [22, Th. 16.3].
Remark 2: The preconditioning matrix Φ is designed to
decouple the system of inclusion in (13) from the graph
structure, i.e., to remove the term Wxk+1 (in this way, xk+1i
does not depend on xk+1j , for i 6= j). This ensures that the
resulting updates can be computed by the agents in a fully-
distributed fashion. 
Remark 3: From Lemma 2 and the explicit form of
the resolvent JΦ−1A in Algorithm 1, we conclude that
dom(JΦ−1A) = RNn and that JΦ−1A is single-valued on
the whole domain. 
B. Convergence analysis
Since the operator Φ−1A is not maximally monotone in
general, the convergence of Algorithm 1 cannot be inferred
by standard results for the PPA. In [20, Th. 5], the au-
thors proposed an accelerated gradient NE seeking scheme,
which achieves geometric convergence if the mapping F a is
strongly monotone. However, this is a limiting assumption,
that can be guaranteed only for some classes of games (cf.
[20, Rem. 3]). Instead, our analysis is based on a weaker
condition, namely the restricted strong monotonicity of F a
only with respect to the NE. This property has already been
exploited in the context of games under partial-decision in-
formation [21], [19]. The main advantage is that, for suitable
choices of the parameter α, restricted strong monotonicity
(unlike strong monotonicity) of F a holds for any game
satisfying Standing Assumptions 1-4, as formalized in the
next two statements.
Lemma 3: The extended pseudo-gradient mapping F in
(6) is θ-Lipschitz continuous, for some µ ≤ θ ≤ θ0: for any
x,y ∈ RNn, ‖F (x)− F (y)‖ ≤ θ‖x− y‖. 
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 4 ( [21, Lem. 3]): Let
M := α
[
µ
N − θ0+θ2√N
− θ0+θ
2
√
N
λ2(L)
α − θ
]
,
αmax :=
4µλ2(L)
(θ0+θ)2+4µθ
,
ρ := λmin(M).
(14)
For any α < αmax, F a is ρ-restricted strongly monotone with
respect to the consensus subspace En := {y ∈ RNn : y =
1N ⊗ y, y ∈ Rn}: for any x ∈ RNn and any y ∈ En, it
holds that M ≻ 0 and also that
(x− y)⊤ (F a(x)− F a(y)) ≥ ρ ‖x− y‖2 .
Moreover, the operator Φ−1A retains this property, in the
space induced by the inner product 〈· | ·〉Φ.
Lemma 5: Let αmax and ρ be as in (14) and choose α ∈
(0, αmax). Then Φ
−1A is ρ‖Φ‖ -restricted strongly monotone,
with respect to zer(A), in the Φ-induced norm: for all
(x,u) ∈ gra(Φ−1A) and all (y,v) ∈ gra(Φ−1A) such that
y ∈ zer(A), it holds that
〈u− v | x− y〉Φ ≥ ρ‖Φ‖‖x− y‖2Φ.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Towards our main result, we next prove the convergence
of the sequence generated by (11) to an equilibrium, under
restricted strong monotonicity of the operator B. The proof
is based on the restricted contractivity of JB with respect to
its (unique) fixed point.
Theorem 1: Let B : Rm ⇒ Rm be restricted strongly
monotone with respect to zer(B), in the space induced by
some inner product 〈· | ·〉Ψ, i.e.
〈x− z | u− v〉Ψ ≥ µ˜‖x− z‖Ψ, (15)
for some µ˜ > 0, for any (x, u), (z, v) ∈ gra(B) such that
z ∈ zer(B). Assume that zer(B) 6= ∅ and that dom(JB) =
R
m, where JB = (Id + B)−1. Then, for any ω0 ∈ Rm, the
proximal-point iteration in (11) converges with linear rate to
the unique point {z} = zer(B):
‖ωk − z‖Ψ ≤
(
1
1 + µ˜
)k
‖ω0 − z‖Ψ.
Proof: See Appendix C.
We are now ready to show the main result of the paper,
namely the linear convergence to a NE of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 2: Let αmax, ρ be as in (14), Φ as in (12), and
let α ∈ (0, αmax). For any initial condition, the sequence
(xk)k∈N generated by Algorithm 1 converges linearly to the
point x∗ = 1n⊗x∗, where x∗ is the unique NE of the game
in (1): for all k ∈ N,
‖xk − x∗‖ ≤
√
‖Φ‖
λmin(Φ)
(
1
1 + ρ/‖Φ‖
)k
‖x0 − x∗‖.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Remark 4: If the mixing matrixW is not doubly stochas-
tic (i.e., if the last condition in Standing Assumption 4 does
not hold), an iteration analogous to Algorithm 1 can be
derived by defining L = D−W , A(x) = αR⊤F (x)+(D−
W )x+NΩ(x) and Φ = D+W , where D = D⊗In and D
is the degree matrix of the graph, for which the convergence
result in Theorem 2 still holds. 
V. DISCUSSION ON THE CONVERGENCE RATE
In this section, we compare the convergence rate of
Algorithm 1 with that of two gradient-based NE seeking
schemes recently presented in [20].
The first algorithm is GRANE [20, Alg. 1], which
converges linearly (in squared norm) under µF a-restricted
strongly monotonicity of F a, with rate
O

(1− 1
θ2
F a
/µ2
F a
)k  , (GRANE)
where θF a is the Lipschitz constant of F a in (7).
The second algorithm is acc-GRANE [20, Alg. 2] whose
(linear) convergence is guaranteed under the more restrictive
assumption of µF a -strong monotonicity of the mapping F a
with respect to the whole space (which requires some addi-
tional assumptions on the game mapping, see [20, Rem. 3]).
Its rate in squared norm is
O
((
1− 1
1 + θF a/µF a
)k )
. (acc-GRANE)
The convergence rate of Algorithm 1, in squared norm, is
O
((
1
1 + µF a/‖Φ‖
)2k )
. (PPP)
Thus, we note that(
1
1+µF a/‖Φ‖
)2
=
(
1− 11+2/µF a
)2
= 1 + 1/(1 + 2/µF a)
2 − 2/(1 + 2/µF a) (16a)
≤ 1− 1/(1 + 2/µF a), (16b)
where we used that ‖Φ‖ = 2 due to Standing Assumption
4. From the expression of αmax in (14), and by picking α <
αmax to ensure restricted strong monotonicity, we deduce
that αF is λ2(L)2 -Lipschitz continuous, where λ2(L) ≤ 2.
Moreover, λmax(L) ≥ 1, when the self-loop weights are
chosen small enough (as the sum of the N − 1 positive
eigenvalues of L is N − ∑i∈I wi,i). Besides, by using
Kronecker product properties, it can be proven that 3 ≥
λmax(L) + λ2(L)/2 ≥ θF a ≥ λmax(L)− λ2(L)/2 ≥ 1/2.
We conclude that, when the condition number γ :=
θF a
µF a
is large (which is typically the case, since µF a is usually
small), Algorithm 1 has a faster (theoretical) convergence
rate than GRANE, by (16b). Moreover, if θF a > 1, then
the upper bound on the rate of Algorithm 1 is better than
that of acc-GRANE by (16a), despite our PPPA is ensured
to converge under milder conditions and requires only one
communication per iteration instead of two.
VI. CASE STUDY: A CONNECTIVITY PROBLEM
As a numerical example, we consider the connectivity
problem described in [13]. This problem is typical in mobile
sensor networks, where some mobile sensing devices have
to coordinate their actions via wireless communication, to
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Fig. 1. Comparison of PPPA, gradient play and GRANE, with the
theoretical step sizes that ensure convergence.
perform some task, e.g., exploration or surveillance. Mathe-
matically, the sensors (agents) aim at autonomously finding
the positions which minimize some global cost. In some
cases (for example when the cost is not exactly known
a priori), this is more conveniently achieved by designing
individual cost functions for the agents, such that the Nash
equilibrium of the resulting game coincide with an optimum
of the global objective (see [13] and references therein).
Specifically, in the connectivity control problem in [13],
each of a group I = {1, . . . , N} of agents is a mobile sensor
moving on a plane, designed to achieve some private primary
objective related to its position, provided that overall connec-
tivity is preserved over the network. This is represented by
the cost functions
Ji(xi, x−i) = qix⊤i xi + rixi +
∑N
j=1mi,j‖xi − xj‖2,
where qi > 0, ri and mi,j ≥ 0 are local parameters,
and xi ∈ R2 are the Cartesian coordinates of agent i, for
all i, j ∈ I. The sum in the cost is intended to penalize
the distance among agents and to ensure connectivity. The
agents cannot measure the positions of the other sensors,
but can communicate with some neighbors over a (randomly
generated) communication network. We set N = 10, mi,j =
1/N ∀i, j ∈ I; we pick randomly with uniform distribution
qi in [1, 2] and ri in [−2, 2]. Because of the quadratic
structure of the game and the choice of the parameters, all of
our assumptions are satisfied. We compare the performance
of Algorithm 1 with that of some gradient-based NE seeking
algorithms proposed in the literature, for random initial
conditions.
Unconstrained action sets: We compare Algorithm 1 with
GRANE [20, Alg. 1] and the gradient play in [28, Eq. 7]. We
set α ≈ 10−2, which satisfies the condition in Theorem 1; for
the other two algorithms we choose the best step sizes with
theoretical convergence guarantees. Figure 1 shows that both
gradient algorithms are overperformed by far by our PPPA.
Indeed, both GRANE and the gradient play are converging
very slowly to the NE: this is mostly due to the small
step sizes employed. However, our numerical experience
suggests that the theoretical bounds for the parameters are
very conservative. In Figure 2, we repeat the experiment by
taking α and the step sizes for GRANE and the gradient
100 102 104
10-4
10-2
100
PPP
GRANE
Gradient
Fig. 2. Comparison of PPPA, gradient play and GRANE, with stepzises
chosen 100 times larger than the theoretical upper bounds.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of PPPA, GRANE, and acc-GRANE, with theoretical
step sizes and compact action sets.
play 100 times bigger than the theoretical upper bounds.
The convergence appears faster for all the algorithms, but
Algorithm 1 is still orders of magnitude better than the
gradient-based schemes.
Constrained action sets: We assume each coordinate of
the position of each sensor to be constrained in the interval
[0.1, 0.5]. We test Algorithm 1 against GRANE [20, Alg. 1]
and the inexact ADMM algorithm in [19, Alg. 1]. Moreover,
we simulate acc-GRANE [20, Alg. 2], that is guaranteed to
converge under strong monotonicity of the mapping F a in
(7): this is a stronger condition than the restricted mono-
tonicity we used, that requires additional assumptions on the
game mapping. We check numerically that the operator F a is
indeed strongly monotone. For all the algorithms, we select
the best step sizes with theoretical guarantees. The results
are illustrated in Figure 3.
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Nash equilibrium problems under partial-decision infor-
mation can be solved via a fully-distributed preconditioned
proximal-point algorithm, under strong monotonicity and
Lipschitz continuity of the game mapping. Our algorithm has
proven much faster than the existing gradient-based methods,
at least in our numerical experience. The extension of our
results to games with coupling constraints or played on time-
varying communication networks is left as future research.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3
Let us define x = col((xi)i∈I), y = col((yi)i∈I). By
Standing Assumption 2, we have, for all i ∈ I,
‖∇iJxi(xi)−∇xiJi(yi)‖ ≤ θ0‖xi − yi‖.
Therefore it holds that
‖F (x)− F (y)‖2 =∑i∈I ‖∇xiJi(xi)−∇xiJi(yi)‖2
≤ θ20
∑
i∈I ‖xi − yi‖2 = θ20‖x− y‖2.
That θ ≥ µ follows by choosing Sx = Sy, x 6= y. 
B. Proof of Lemma 5
Consider any (x,u) ∈ gra(Φ−1A) and (y,v) ∈
gra(Φ−1A) such that y ∈ zer(A) = zer(Φ−1A). By defini-
tion, (x,Φu) ∈ gra(A) and (y,Φv) ∈ gra(A). Moreover,
the operator A in (8) is ρ-restricted strongly monotone
with respect to the consensus subspace En, by Lemma 4
and monotonicity of the normal cone [22, Th. 20.25]. Also
zer(A) ∈ En by Lemma 1. Therefore we can write:
〈u− v | x− y〉Φ = 〈Φu − Φv | x− y〉
≥ ρ‖x− y‖2 ≥ ρ‖Φ‖‖x− y‖2Φ.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
We note that fix(JB) = zer(B), since, for any z ∈ Rm,
0m ∈ B(z) ⇔ z ∈ z + B(z) ⇔ (Id + B)−1(z) ∋ z.
For any y ∈ JB(x) and by definition of resolvent JB(x) =
(Id+B)−1(x), it follows that x−y ∈ B(y). Let z ∈ zer(B);
therefore, the restricted strong monotonicity property in (15)
(by choosing v = 0m) reads as
〈y − z | x− y − (z − z)〉Ψ
=− ‖y − z‖2Ψ + 〈y − z | x− z〉Ψ ≥ µ˜‖y − z‖2Ψ.
(17)
Therefore, by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have that
‖y − z‖Ψ‖x− z‖Ψ ≥ (1 + µ˜)‖y − z‖2Ψ. (18)
We note that, for x = z, the previous inequality implies
y = z, hence JB is single valued on fix(JB) = zer(B). Also,
by taking x = wk and y = wk+1, by dividing both sides of
(18) by ‖y − z‖Ψ if y 6= z, we obtain for the iteration in
(11):
‖ωk+1 − z‖Ψ ≤
(
1
1+µ˜
)
‖ωk − z‖Ψ;
obviously, this trivially holds also if y = z. By recursion,
we conclude convergence of the sequence (ωk)k∈N to z with
linear rate. Since z is any point in zer(B), it also follows that
zer(B) must be a singleton. 
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 2 states that Algorithm 1 is an instance of the
PPA, applied to the operator Φ−1A in (8). By Lemma 1,
x∗ is the unique zero of A. The resolvent JΦ−1A has full
domain by Remark 3. Therefore, by Lemma 5, we can apply
Theorem 1 and conclude that√
λmin(Φ)‖xk − x∗‖ ≤ ‖xk − x∗‖Φ
≤
(
1
1+ρ/‖Φ‖
)k
‖x0 − x∗‖Φ
≤
√
‖Φ‖
(
1
1+ρ/‖Φ‖
)k
‖x0 − x∗‖.
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